

## TRAGIC FORM AND FEELING IN THE *ILIAD*

ἰὸν ἰού · τὰ πάντα ἄν ἐξήκοι σαφή.

Soph. *OT* 1182

These hours of backward clearness come to all men and women, once at least, when they read the past in the light of the present, with the reasons of things, like unobserved finger-posts, protruding where they never saw them before. The journey behind them is mapped out, and figured with its false steps, its wrong observations, all its infatuated, deluded geography.

Henry James, *The Bostonians*, ch. xxxix<sup>1</sup>

### I

THIS paper is intended to contribute to the study of both Homer and Greek tragedy, and more particularly to the study of the influence of the epic upon the later poets. The current revival of interest among English scholars in the poetic qualities of the Homeric poems must be welcomed by all who care for the continuing survival and propagation of classical literature.<sup>2</sup> The renewed emphasis on the validity of literary criticism as applied to presumably oral texts may encourage a more positive appreciation of the subtlety of Homeric narrative techniques, and of the coherent plan which unifies each poem. The aim of this paper is to focus attention on a number of elements in Greek tragedy which are already present in Homer, and especially on the way in which these poets exploit the theme of knowledge—knowledge of one's future, knowledge of one's circumstances, knowledge of oneself. Recent scholarship on tragedy has paid much more attention to literary criticism in general and to poetic irony in particular: these insights can also illuminate the epic. Conversely, the renewed interest in Homer's structural and thematic complexity should also enrich the study of the tragedians, his true heirs.<sup>3</sup>

I begin and end with Homer, in the belief that this is where the greater need for serious literary criticism still lies; and on the whole I restrict my attention to the *Iliad*, not because there are no connections between the *Odyssey* and tragedy in terms of plot and technique, but because these links are for the most part of a different kind. The *Odyssey* finds its closest affinity with Euripides, who for related reasons figures less prominently in this paper than his two predecessors.<sup>4</sup> The kind of play that Euripides makes with knowledge and ignorance of identity is very Odyssean in quality; but there is correspondingly less focus, at least in the majority of his *oeuvre*, on the Iliadic themes of self-knowledge and understanding of the divine plan. The present paper is not, however, intended as an exhaustive treatment of those themes, even if that were possible, but is meant to stimulate further and broader discussion.

In *Iliad* xviii, Achilles learns of the death of Patroclus, and immediately realises his own responsibility and his past errors. His impetuous demand that Zeus show him honour by punishing the Greek army has been fulfilled, but with bitter and ironic consequences for himself. (See i 407–12, 505–10; xviii 73–84.) In the scene in which this news reaches him we see the meaning of this reversal, which is to lead to his own death, presented symbolically: thus Achilles grovels on the earth, defiles his face with dust and dirt, lies outstretched like a dead man (xviii

<sup>1</sup> I owe this parallel to Dr M. Winterbottom, whose teaching has enhanced my understanding of Homer as of other authors with whom his name is more usually associated. I have also been much helped by comments on this paper by Dr O. Taplin, and by many discussions of Homer with Miss E. Kearns. Finally, I thank Mrs P. E. Easterling and the late C. W. Macleod, for valuable criticisms and advice, and the latter for constant stimulus over a longer period. I offer this paper as a tribute to his memory.

<sup>2</sup> See esp. J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford 1980), hereafter 'Griffin', and the articles which preceded this outstanding study; and now C. W. Macleod,

*Homer: Iliad xxiv* (Cambridge 1982). Adam Parry, in his introduction to Milman Parry, *The Making of Homeric Verse* (Oxford 1971) l–lix, had already pointed the way: cf. Macleod, *Notes & Queries* xxi (1974) 318–19.

<sup>3</sup> For ancient statements of the debt which the tragedians owed to Homer, see *Pl. Rep.* x 595c, *Arist. Poet.* 4.1448b38 f., 8.51a22–30, 23.59a29–34; also Gudeman on *Poet.* 3.48a6; *Aesch. ap. Athen.* viii 347e; *Vita Soph.* 20; *Ps.-Plut. de vita et poesi Hom.* 213; *Radt, TGF* iv T 115–16; N. J. Richardson, *CQ* xxx (1980) 270.

<sup>4</sup> For related contrasts see *Arist. Poet.* 24.59b10–16; *Ps.-Long.* 9.15, 29.2 with Russell's nn.

22–7), and is mourned by the slavegirls and by the nymphs who attend on Thetis (23–31, 35–69).<sup>5</sup> But this scene is more than simply passionate and plangent: for despite his frenzied grief, Achilles' speeches here and throughout the rest of the poem are pervaded by a terrible rationality, not unlike the speech in which Oedipus endeavours to explain why he blinded himself (Soph. *OT* 1369 ff.). Achilles both recognises his responsibility and accepts the consequences. It is in part this clear-sightedness that makes him a heroic figure. Whereas formerly, ignorant of the details of his fate, he wished to evade it (ix 316–20, 401–16), he now learns of the imminence of his death and accepts it (xviii 95 ff.).<sup>6</sup> Homer makes it plain that Achilles' doom is of his own choosing, and also that the death of Patroclus was his own responsibility; for Achilles failed to remember a divine warning (xviii 6–14, discussed further in section IV below). This misjudgement undermines Achilles' former self-confidence and egoism: it also transforms his earlier desire for either life or honour (ix 413, 415) into a longing for revenge and a prayer for death (xviii 90–3, 98–106).<sup>7</sup>

This scene is a crucial turning-point in the poem, not least because of the divine background; for the gods have not only foreseen and prophesied Achilles' error of judgement, but have also made its enormity painfully clear to him. All Achilles' hopes, expectations and assumptions have been deceived. This situation, above all the powerful moment of revelation, is tragic not only in the emotions it expresses, but in its thematic significance: for the gulf between human deliberation and divine foreknowledge is a constant theme in Greek tragedy as in Homer. 'The desires of Zeus are hard to track; in darkness and shadow the paths of his thought move to their goal, undiscernible', sings the chorus of Aeschylus' *Suppliants* (87–90). 'Nothing that is of the divine is clear to mortal sight', laments Megara in Euripides' *Heracles* (62). 'In our vainglory we think ourselves wiser than the gods', says Theseus with stern disapproval (Eur. *Supp.* 217–18).<sup>8</sup> Earlier in the *Iliad* the Greek embassy supplicated Achilles like a god (see ix 158–9, 496–501; cf. 155, 297, 301–3). But man is not a god, as Achilles is to learn and as tragedy teaches. Above all, Achilles is bound by mortality; and the same gods who honoured him and raised him up will ultimately bring about his end.<sup>9</sup>

Achilles then in many respects foreshadows the heroes of tragedy, and in particular those of Sophocles' plays—in his defiant resolution, his impatience with consolation, his longing to die and so to remove the shame and guilt of his actions.<sup>10</sup> Typical of tragedy also is his indifference to others' advice or their willingness to help: this is powerfully captured in the way that Antilochus sits helplessly by him, weeping but unable to help (xviii 32 ff.).<sup>11</sup> Finally, Achilles is the archetypal tragic figure in his inability, for all his power and greatness, to dictate or influence the course of future events: for even when he seems most in control, his own plans and prestige form part of a wider picture which he can see only in details. And even in the later books of the poem, as his knowledge and understanding of events increase, so too does his helplessness.

Thus the *peripeteia* of the *Iliad*, like that of the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, depends on a change in the hero's knowledge of his position, a change that confirms and explains past foreknowledge. This new knowledge also reveals the extent and the catastrophic consequences of past ignorance and

<sup>5</sup> On this episode see further K. Reinhardt, *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter* (Göttingen 1961) 348–73.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Macleod, *Iliad xxiv* (n.2) 23–8.

<sup>7</sup> On death-wishes in tragedy, see Collard on Eur. *Supp.* 86.

<sup>8</sup> See further Collard *ad loc.* and on 504–5.

<sup>9</sup> Another aspect of Achilles' human limitations is brought out in the Theomachy. Here his defiance of the gods is perilous, and for all his greatness he will be punished: he himself recalls this at xxi 275 ff., and the gods, especially Scamander, resent his brutality (xxi 136, 147, 214, 217–21, 306, 314–15). This stands in contrast with the prudence of Diomedes in the earlier theomachy: Diomedes remembers the warning he has

received (v 815–24) from Athene, and observes the limits laid upon him (see v 121 ff., 443–4, 606, 815–24; vi 129–41 is not therefore inconsistent). See further Ø. Andersen, *Die Diomedesgestalt in der Ilias*, Symb. Osl. supp. xxv (1975) ch. iv; and on theomachoi in tragedy J. C. Kamerbeek, *Mnemos.* 4 i (1948) 271–83.

<sup>10</sup> In general, see B. M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper* (Berkeley/L.A. 1964) chs i–ii, esp. pp. 50–2.

<sup>11</sup> Antilochus' fear that Achilles will kill himself (xviii 34) also finds echoes in tragedy, e.g. Soph. *Aj.* 326–7, 583–8, Eur. *Med.* 37, and the whole final scene of the *Heracles* (see Bond on 1248; Stanford's comm. on *Ajax*, appendix E).

error. The pathos of such a situation emerges from the actual construction of the narrative, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος (Arist. *Poet.* 14.53b2).<sup>12</sup> The author exploits the knowledge and expectations of his audience, and as his work advances he brings out further the connection of cause and effect, the sombre inevitability of choice and consequence. This tragic pattern is already present in the *Iliad*—more diffusely presented, as the epic form made natural, but in no way less sophisticated or less profound.<sup>13</sup> The object of this paper is to develop some of these comparisons between Homer and his successors, and to comment, albeit selectively, on the tragic and compassionate outlook that these structural devices serve to communicate.

## II

In Chapters 14 and 16 of the *Poetics* Aristotle discusses the different categories of ἀναγνώρισις, and the closely related ideas of ἄγνοια and ἀμαρτία. At 14.53b27 ff. he sets out the possibilities for the agents involved: either (1) they can be εἰδότες καὶ γινώσκοντας concerning what they are doing and whom they are damaging, as is the case with Medea in Euripides; or (2) they can commit the deed ἀγνοοῦντας . . . εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους; or (3) they may through their ignorance intend to do τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων and then ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν ποιῆσαι (as happens in Eur. *Ion*, *IT*, *Cresphontes*, *Helle*).

From his examples and his references to φιλία, it is plain that Aristotle considered ἀναγνώρισις to be a matter of the characters knowing each other's identities, and especially being aware of their familial relationships (cf. 14.53b20 ff.).<sup>14</sup> This again is something that he traces back to the epic, finding its ancestry in the recognition-scenes in the second half of the *Odyssey* (referred to at 16.54b25 ff.). While this conception is central to the plays he cites, above all the *OT*, it can be viewed rather as a sub-class of a broader and more significant kind of recognition, which I should prefer to call 'realisation'. This is not in fact discussed by Aristotle, although it seems to be allowed for in the general definition of ἀναγνώρισις given in *Poet.* 11.52a29 ff., which is also the passage that makes clearest the connection with human ignorance. The relevant lines run as follows:

ἀναγνώρισις δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὠρισμένων· καλλίστη δὲ ἀναγνώρισις, ὅταν ἅμα περιπετεία γένηται, οἶον ἔχει ἢ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι. εἰσὶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναγνωρίσεις· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα ἴεσθιν ὥσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει† καὶ εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἔστιν ἀναγνωρίσαι.<sup>15</sup>

Aristotle goes on to say that the most powerful kind of recognition is that involving blood-relationship, but he clearly recognises that other possibilities exist, notably the discovery 'whether one has done something', a no less apt description of what happens at the climax of the *OT*. Indeed, for all the power and terror which the story of Oedipus' incest and parricide possesses (cf. *Poet.* 14.53b1–7), its full pathos is brought out just as much by the way in which Oedipus' power and wisdom, his supreme energy, his faith in himself and his own mentality, are the very things which lead him to ruin and despair, and which in the end prove useless to him. The *anagnorisis* of Oedipus entails the acquisition of fresh knowledge which changes his whole perspective: the final piece of the jigsaw is in place, and forces him to see the true state of affairs, to apprehend the magnitude of his error.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Cf. B. Vickers, *Towards Greek Tragedy* (London 1973) 62.

<sup>13</sup> Contra J. M. Bremer, *Hamartia* (Amsterdam 1969) 99, 'in a more or less rudimentary form in Homer'.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. B. Knox, *Word and Action* (Baltimore 1979) 21–2.

<sup>15</sup> For helpful observations on this passage and its

context, see G. F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: the Argument* (Cambridge Mass. 1957) 342–55.

<sup>16</sup> For 'error' and 'flaw' in the *OT* and elsewhere, see esp. T. C. W. Stinton, *CQ* xxv (1975) 221–54, and the discussion in subsequent issues. For the Homeric background see Bremer (n. 13) 99–111, who somewhat over-emphasises the element of divine control.

The key moment, at which Oedipus does see the truth and feels his world collapsing around him, comes with the line (1182) which is set at the head of this paper. All has now emerged *clearly*, σαφή: he *sees* his error,<sup>17</sup> even later when he is blind, and this contrasts with his earlier failure to understand and see his situation (esp. 412–19). This sequence provides the clearest example in tragedy of a conception which we can discern also in the play most closely akin to *OT*, namely *Trachiniae*. Here too the fate of Heracles is foretold by prophecy but misunderstood; then at the end of the play the truth is seen in the light of new information, but it is seen too late. Again the critical moment is recognised in the words of the suffering hero: at *Tra.* 1145, when Hyllus informs him that the agent of his death was the supposed love-potion made from the centaur's blood, Heracles cries:

οἴμοι, φρονῶ δὴ ξυμφορᾶς ἴν' ἔσταμεν.

and shortly afterwards he explains: he was forewarned (1159 πρόφαντον) that he would die by the hand of no living creature:

ὄδ' οὖν ὁ θῆρ Κένταυρος, ὡς τὸ θεῖον ἦν  
 πρόφαντον, οὕτω ζῶντά μ' ἔκτεινεν θανῶν.  
 φανῶ δ' ἐγὼ τούτοισι συμβαίνοντ' ἴσα  
 μαντεῖα καινά, τοῖς πάλαι ξυνήγορα. (1162–5)

Heracles had also been told by the oracles of Dodona that after a fixed time, which has now elapsed, all his labours would be over. Now the interpretation of this too is clear:

τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρ' οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν θανεῖν ἐμέ (1172)  
 ταῦτ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ λαμπρὰ συμβαίνει, τέκνον (1174)

Here λαμπρὰ is like σαφή in the parallel passage of *OT*. In both cases the imperfection of human knowledge and judgement allows a man to believe he has reason for confidence and hope, only to find that he has in reality only seen a part of the picture. Absolute knowledge belongs only to the gods, and although in tragedy, as in the work of Herodotus,<sup>18</sup> the gods may grant us occasional fragments of information, man's very humanity leads him to misunderstand and to judge amiss. Yet the poet in part shares the knowledge of the gods, and permits the audience to anticipate the hero's realisation.

In this respect *Trachiniae* differs, however, from *OT*, since the ambiguity about the actual content of the oracles is preserved throughout much of the play,<sup>19</sup> and this means that the audience's foreknowledge is not so certain, whereas the true irony of Oedipus' situation is established and exploited by the poet from the beginning. Further, the action of *Trachiniae* allots error and death to Deianira as well as Heracles. In her case this error is the product of purely human reasoning and impulse, and regretted when she realises the consequences. The position of Deianira is analogous to that of Heracles only in that she sees the truth too late:

ὄρω δέ μ' ἔργον δεινὸν ἐξεργασμένην. (706)  
 ὦν ἐγὼ μεθύστερον,  
 ὄτ' οὐκέτ' ἄρκει, τὴν μάθησιν ἄρνυμαι. (710–11)

Thus she appreciates that her reasoning powers (*cf.* 590 ff., answered by 668–9) have in fact been clouded by her hopes, hopes that sprang from the all-too-natural weakness of human love,

<sup>17</sup> *Cf.* R. G. A. Buxton, *JHS* c (1980) 22–37; also a forthcoming study by David Seale, as Mrs Easterling informs me.

<sup>18</sup> For a comparison of oracle-types in Herodotus and Greek tragedy, see B. M. W. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (Yale 1957) 33–47. For examples of ironic twist and unexpected fulfilment, see *Hdt.* i 53.2, 66.2–4, iii 64.4 (*cf.* Shakespeare, *HIV* Pt 2 *IV v ad fin.*), vi 76.1 and

80; also J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley/L.A. 1978) 58–70, 80, 96–100. On Herodotus and Sophocles see now A. J. Podlecki, in *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean*, *Festschr. F. Schachermeyer*, ed. K. H. Kinzl (Berlin 1977) 248–9.

<sup>19</sup> See W. Kranz, *Studien zur antiken Literatur und ihrem Fortwirken* (Heidelberg 1967) 285 ff.; M. D. Reeve, *GRBS* xi (1970) 283 ff.

which she had recognised as present in herself before she ever laid her plans (438 ff., esp. 444).<sup>20</sup> But there is nothing supernatural in her sudden, guilty horror: rather, her experience and that of Heracles represent two elements in a tragic plot, which in the other play are united in the figure and fate of Oedipus, at once the victim of divine admonition and human weakness.

Hyllus, the son of Heracles and Deianira, provides another element. In his ignorance he denounces Deianira as a treacherous murderess, and in her guilty awareness of what she has done she is unable to answer him. Thus she finds herself alienated from both husband and son (see esp. 790–3, 807–9), and departs in silence, having nothing further to live for. In due course Hyllus learns how he has misjudged her, and experiences the agony of knowing that it was his cruelty that drove her to suicide.

ἰδὼν δ' ὁ παῖς ᾤμωξεν· ἔγνω γὰρ τάλας  
 τοῦργον κατ' ὀργήν ὡς ἐφάψειεν τόδε,  
 ὃψ' ἐκδιδαχθεῖς τῶν κατ' οἶκον οὐνεκα  
 ἄκουσα πρὸς τοῦ θηρὸς ἔρξειεν τάδε.

(932–5)

This pattern of 'late-learning' in the two dramas has been commented on by a number of critics,<sup>21</sup> but it does not seem to have been realised quite how prevalent it is, and how integrally related to themes which have generally received much more attention, such as the power and knowledge of the gods, above all when contrasted with the limitations and failures of human insight and action. These themes are central to much that is greatest and most influential in Greek literature and thought; and already in the *Iliad* they are united in the tragic pattern of human *ῥψιμαθία*.

The *Antigone* provides us with a further example. There Creon is warned by wiser men: by the chorus his views are doubted or corrected from an early stage (perhaps 213; further 278–9, 724–5, 770), but it is only after the representative of the gods, Tiresias, has spoken that they also make their feelings plain (1091–4, 1098; cf. 509). In the end Creon yields, accepting the chorus's plea for *εὐβουλία* (1098), and realising that he is forced to obey (1105 f.). But his change of mind comes too late, and he finds that he has destroyed not only the offender but his son and his wife. Like Oedipus he accepts the responsibility for his own misjudgements and mistakes. The language of his speech at this point is rich in the vocabulary of rational thought: 1261 *ἰὼ / φρενῶν δυσφρόνων ἀμαρτήματα*; 1265 *ᾧμοι ἐμῶν ἄνολβα βουλευμάτων*; 1268–9 *ἔθανες, ἀπελύθης / ἐμαῖς οὐδὲ σαισι δυσβουλίαις*. The chorus grimly says to him: *οἴμ' ὡς ἔοικας ὀψὲ τὴν δίκην ἰδεῖν*. And Creon replies: *οἴμοι, / ἔχω μαθὼν δεῖλαιος* (1270–1). Thus the stress Creon himself laid on *τῶν ἀρίστων . . . βουλευμάτων* (179) as essential for any statesman finds its ironic reversal: and the deeper but still incomplete vision of the chorus, reflecting on the powers and the wonder of mankind (332 ff.)<sup>22</sup> is qualified and yet also

<sup>20</sup> Line 444 is sensitively defended by T. C. W. Stinton, *JHS* xcvi (1976) 135–6.

<sup>21</sup> See esp. C. H. Whitman, *Sophocles: A Study in Heroic Humanism* (Cambridge Mass. 1951) ch. vi, and p. 265 n. 4, citing Soph. *Ant.* (quoted in text), and also Aesch. *Ag.* 1425, Pind. *P.* v 28 ff., Eur. *Or.* 99, Aeschin. iii 157. Add Eur. *Alc.* 940 (with Dale's comm., p. xxii); *Hipp.* 1401 (and the whole situation of Theseus at the time of Artemis's revelation); *Ba.* 1120 f., 1285, 1296, 1345; perhaps Aesch. *Septem* 655, 709–11. See also A. D. Nock, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (Oxford 1972) 538; West on Hes. *Op.* 218, adding Hom. *Od.* viii 564–71 with xiii 125–87 (esp. 169, 172 f.); ix 507 ff., xviii 124–57. The non-tragic nature of the *Odyssey* (cf. F. Jacoby, *Kl. Philol. Schriften* [Berlin 1961] i 107–39) means that the *ῥψιμαθία* pattern is attached to unsympathetic characters (Aegisthus, the Cyclops, the suitors), not to the successful hero, whom the prophecies favour.

(The fate of the Phaeacians is an interesting exception.) In the *Iliad*, compare ii 325, 330 (the Greeks will sack Troy). A related conception, that of *πάθει μάθος*, has received much more attention: cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford 1973) 59–62; West on Hes. *Op.* 218; Headlam–Thomson on Aesch. *Eum.* 520 f., who point out that this idea is in turn linked with the precept *γνώθι σεαυτόν*. Such self-knowledge involves above all consciousness of the gulf between god and man: see *Il.* v 440–2, xvi 705–9, xxiv 525–6, etc.; *Od.* xviii 129–42; also Richardson on *hDem.* 147–8.

<sup>22</sup> For an interesting though occasionally fanciful analysis of this ode see C. P. Segal, *Arion* iii (1964) 46–66 = *Sophocles*, ed. T. Woodard (New Jersey 1966) 62–85. For further connections with fifth-century thought see Knox (n. 18) 107 ff.; E. A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (London 1957) 66 ff.

confirmed. Human wisdom has been shown as imperfect and two-edged (365–70, cf. 1347–53); and one thing from which no mortal, neither Antigone nor Creon, can find a remedy or an escape is the irreversible force of death.<sup>23</sup>

## III

Not only oracles but prophetic dreams function in this manner in the tragedians. Again, this is a legacy of Homer.<sup>24</sup> In the *Odyssey* in particular, the dreams which Athene grants to Penelope offer both hope and cause for unease. Dreams may deceive, as Penelope explains (xix 560–9) and as we know from the second book of the *Iliad*; and like oracular pronouncements they can be misinterpreted and may provoke illogical, though very human, reactions. A famous and much-debated instance is the dream Penelope narrates at xix 535–53, in which she grieved at the slaughter of her geese.<sup>25</sup> Her failure to interpret the omen, recognising the eagle as Odysseus, surely prefigures her doubts and hesitation in book xxiii, and this is consistent with Penelope's disillusioned hopelessness, the fruit of many disappointments. The theme of omens misunderstood or ignored, which is constantly exploited in the *Odyssey*, is thus adapted to the special case of Penelope, with particularly poignant and sympathetic force.<sup>26</sup> (Compare Eur. *IT* 42–58, where Iphigenia interprets an optimistic dream pessimistically.)

In Aeschylus' *Persae* and *Choephoroi*, and in Sophocles' *Electra*, the dreams which disturb the rest of the Persian queen and of Clytemnestra are prophetic, and function in a way parallel to the Delphic warning which is given to Oedipus: while the foreknowledge is terrible, no advice or aid is given which might enable the human recipient to escape. But it is striking that the fulfilment is also presented, as it were, intellectually: the Queen, who in the earlier part of the play is ignorant of the very location of Athens (231), and more significantly about its form of government (241 f.), advances in understanding as she does in dismay and suffering. We may also note the close verbal resemblance between her reaction to the messenger's grim catalogue of disaster and the moments of horrified insight quoted from the Sophoclean plays in the previous section. She cries:

ὦ νυκτὸς ὄψις ἐμφανῆς ἐνυπνίων,  
ὡς κάρτα μοι σαφῶς ἐδήλωσας κακά. (518–19)

All is only too clear, too late. This suggests a touch of dramatic irony in her earlier narration of the dream: never has she seen a dream so *clear* (179 *ἐναργές*), but the full meaning and force of the vision is not apparent to her until the later scene. With this comprehension comes realisation of the wider significance, of the divine hand at work (472 f.); this also stands in contrast with Xerxes' ignorance (361, 373, 454). Whereas the queen had previously had to question the chorus about Athens and Greece, she now pronounces with authority: this is Xerxes' bitter, but righteous, punishment (473–7). In this she is the true wife of Darius, who subsequently confirms the supernatural interpretation of events. She speaks with heightened dignity in disaster; it is she who proposes the summoning of Darius' ghost, and she addresses him as an equal: the two royal figures remorselessly fill the gaps in each other's knowledge.

For Darius too recognises the Persian downfall as the fulfilment of a supernatural warning, in this case oracular (740–50; 800–4). The warnings he passed on to his son were not sufficient

<sup>23</sup> For related themes in Sophocles see the passages collected by J. C. Opstelten, *Sophocles and Greek Pessimism* (Amsterdam 1952) 124–5. For the futility of human intelligence and insight as a recurrent theme in Euripides' plays see Dodds (n. 21) 80–9; also Opstelten 132 (very unselective). For the general prevalence of this theme in fifth-century literature see C. W. Macleod, *PCPS* xxv (1979) 53–60.

<sup>24</sup> See esp. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley/L.A. 1951) 102–11; also W. S. Messor, *The*

*Dream in Homer and Greek Tragedy* (New York 1918).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. G. Méautis, *Paideia* xv (1960) 81–6.

<sup>26</sup> In general on omens in the *Odyssey* see A. J. Podlecki, *G&R* xiv (1967) 12–23. For Herodotean parallels involving dreams misunderstood or ignored, see i 34.2 with 45.2, 107–8, 209–210.1, iii 124.1–2, 125.4, v 55–6, vi 107, vii 12–19. Omens ignored: Hdt. i 59.2, vii 37.3, 57.1–2, etc. The wise advisor: H. Bischoff, *Der Warner bei Herodot* (Diss. Marburg 1932); R. Lattimore, *CPh* xxxiv (1939) 24–35.

(783); they were based, moreover, on insufficient consciousness of the danger on Darius' part: *φεῦ ταχεῖα* (739) and *ἐγὼ . . . ἠΰχουν* (740–1) emphasise that he had thought the disaster might still be postponed for many generations (*cf.* Hdt. i 13.2 with 91: another case of warnings forgotten). Yet the intensity of the tragedy lies in the very fact of the warnings—their obscurity before, their terrible clarity and inevitability when seen in their fulfilment. Nor are the gods to blame, who have been both just and consistent: for Xerxes, as for Sophocles' Creon, the personal responsibility is inescapable.<sup>27</sup>

Again, in the *Choephoroi*, Aeschylus lays powerful stress on the dream of Clytemnestra, who like Atossa attempts to avert it by prayer and sacrifice. It is referred to at an early stage (32 ff.), described to Orestes (523 ff.), and explained by him (540 ff.). This is important because the dream, if true and truly interpreted (*cf.* 542, 551), provides confirmation of the divine mandate, commanding and assuring the success of Orestes' mission; it serves a similar function to the taking of omens. Later, the dream is referred to again at the climax of the play, as Orestes confronts Clytemnestra. Here again, to understand the dream's interpretation is to see the hopelessness of her position:

Κλ. οἶ' γὰρ, τεκοῦσα τόνδ' ὄφιν ἐθρεψάμην.  
 Ὅρ. ἦ κάρτα μάντις οὐξ ὄνειράτων φόβος.<sup>28</sup> (Cho. 928–9)

A somewhat similar stroke introduces this scene, as the slave cries out 'I tell you, the dead are killing the living' (886), to which Clytemnestra replies with a flash of near-despair:

οἶ' γὰρ [*cf.* 928], ξυνῆκα τοῦπος ἐξ αἰνιγμάτων.  
 δόλοισι δολούμεθ' ὥσπερ οὖν ἐκτείναμεν. (887–8)

No oracle is involved here, but the riddling phrase of the slave creates a comparable effect, allowing Clytemnestra to interpret it with her characteristic speed and acumen. Yet her defiance, and her dialectical skill, prove useless in the ensuing scene (in contrast with her verbal and physical victory in the corresponding exchange in the *Agamemnon*, 931 ff.<sup>29</sup>). And the slave's words voice a more significant truth concerning the vengeance of the dead and the anger of the nether gods: the ambiguous, riddling syntax gives his line the quality of an omen, for riddles and oracles are akin.<sup>30</sup> Clytemnestra's response shows her realisation of the central truth of the trilogy, the law of retribution: but as with Agamemnon and Orestes, the full realisation comes only with the event.<sup>31</sup>

The richest source in Aeschylus' work of such intellectual and prophetic imagery is the *Agamemnon* itself: indeed, the whole *Oresteia* may from one point of view be studied in terms of the degree of insight and foresight which its different characters possess.<sup>32</sup> The language of prophecy and premonition runs through the choruses;<sup>33</sup> the prophet Calchas has warned them of disasters past and to come; the prophetess Cassandra speaks with an authority that confirms and deepens their greatest fears. The choral odes present a conflict between the speakers' compulsion to seek explanation, to understand the chain of events preceding the return and downfall of Agamemnon, and their human reluctance to contemplate the possible outcome (*esp.*

<sup>27</sup> In general on the theology of the *Persae* see R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *JHS* xciii (1973) 210–19.

<sup>28</sup> I strongly doubt Page's reattribution of 929 to Clytemnestra, and less certainly question the likelihood of Macleod's proposal *ap. O. Taplin, The Stagecraft of Aeschylus* (Oxford 1977) 356 n. 2.

<sup>29</sup> *Cf.* Taplin (n. 28) 356–7.

<sup>30</sup> *Cf.* West on Hes. *Op.* 202.

<sup>31</sup> The 'riddle' passage is imitated by Sophocles at *El.* 1476–81 (as the repetition of *ξυνῆκα τοῦπος* makes certain). There the victim is Aegisthus, and when he recognises Orestes' identity, the latter taunts him as a *μάντις* who has failed until that moment (1481). But Aegisthus, like Polymestor in Eur. *Hec.* 1257–84,

achieves a kind of status at the end as a prophet of future evils (*El.* 1497–8; *cf.* n. 38), which Orestes' bluster cannot simply brush aside (1499 *ἐγὼ σοι μάντις εἰμὶ τῶνδ' ἄκρος*, says Orestes, deliberately refusing to look further). This scene thus carries heavy implications of reprisals for the victors, however hazily defined. Different again is the prophetic role of Cassandra in Eur. *Tro.* 353–461.

<sup>32</sup> See Dodds, *loc. cit.* (n. 21); Taplin (n. 28) 327–9, 356–7.

<sup>33</sup> See further B. Alexanderson, *Eranos* lxxvii (1969) 1–23; W. C. Scott, *Phoenix* xxiii (1969) 336–46; D. Sansone, *Aeschylean Metaphors for Intellectual Activity*, *Hermes Einzels.* xxxv (1975) ch. iii.

248–55). It is in the latter spirit that they withdraw their acceptance of the news that Troy has fallen (475–87). This clash of feelings reaches its highest intensity in the ode that follows Agamemnon's entry into the palace: here the language of foreknowledge is very prominent (977 *τερασκόπου*, 978 *μαντιπολεῖ*, 981 *δυσκρίτων*, 989 *αὐτόμαρτυς*, 991 *αὐτοδίδακτος*, 992, 999 *ἐλπίδος*, 995 *ματάζει*; also 997 *τελεσφόροις* ~ 1000 *τελεσφόρον*, cf. *Cho.* 541 on Clytemnestra's dream). Here it serves to heighten our sense of the chorus's terror as they wait poised between doubt and certainty about events within the house. These events Cassandra, the true *μάντις*, will shortly unveil in their full and terrible significance. Her insight is that of divine dispensation: where the chorus guess and fear, she truly knows. Yet the subsequent scene shows not only the difficulty she finds in conveying her insight to others and convincing them (1074 f., 1077 f., 1105 f., 1112–13, 1119 ff., 1130 ff.) but their reluctance to accept it even when they do understand (1162 ff., 1173 ff.). The chorus shrink from the dark prophecy that she finally makes explicit (1247, and their subsequent replies). Moreover, Cassandra's knowledge of his own fate gives her neither protection nor consolation (cf. sections IV–V below on Achilles' similar foreknowledge); nor does it enable her to help Agamemnon or the chorus. Such knowledge brings its possessor neither nobility nor fame (despite the chorus's hopes, 1302, 1304), but only a clearer insight into the tragedy of humanity—its infinite blindness and insignificance in contrast with the supreme and inescapable power of the gods (*Ag.* 1322–30; 1485–8, where the chorus too have come to share Cassandra's despairing fatalism).

*ὦ βρότεια πράγματα* (1327). Cassandra's words sum up a view of the world which derives from Homer, and which is prominent also in the pessimism of archaic lyric. Man is ephemeral and wretched; above all, he cannot know his future, and so can never guarantee the security of his happiness or his expectations.<sup>34</sup> But the proper response to this is not simply despair, but pity (*Ag.* 1321 [the chorus]; 1330 [Cassandra])—pity that recognises the community of human suffering, pity that is founded in knowledge of one's limitations and which is granted to those who share them with oneself.<sup>35</sup> The tragedy of Cassandra is that pity is all that she can give, to her father and brothers and her people as to Agamemnon, who has destroyed them. So also for Achilles the understanding which allows him to pity his enemy comes too late; and his own death, the place and authors of which are known to him, can no longer be altered or postponed, but only awaited.

#### IV

Without having exhausted either the examples of this motif in tragedy or the significance of those presented above, we may now look back to the more large-scale, more intricate use of the same pattern in the *Iliad*. Here the central figure in the pattern is of course Achilles; but it is also important to define the similarities and differences between his actions and reactions, and those of both Patroclus and Hector.<sup>36</sup>

The poet's great design makes the death of Patroclus lead inevitably to the death of Hector, and the slaying of Hector by Achilles in turn precipitates Achilles' own death (cf. xviii 96 *αὐτίκα γάρ τοι ἔπειτα μεθ' Ἑκτορα πόντος ἐτοῖμος*). The moment of each hero's supreme triumph makes his destruction inevitable. This sequence is emphasised by the parallels between the death-scenes of Patroclus and Hector.<sup>37</sup> Both fall before a superior warrior; Patroclus and

<sup>34</sup> H. Fränkel, *TAPA* lxxvii (1946) 131–45 and *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (Oxford 1976) index p. 530, provides a valuable collection of material. This also figures as a central theme in Griffin, esp. ch. vi (more fully *CQ* xxviii [1978] 1–22).

<sup>35</sup> Cf. section V below.

<sup>36</sup> Griffin 43–4, 163, makes important points in this connection, but his remarks are very brief. See further the excellent essay by W. Schadewaldt, *Von Homers Welt und Werk*<sup>4</sup> (Leipzig 1965) 240–67; and on Hector,

H. Erbse, *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Berlin/N.Y. 1979) 1–18 = *Kyklus*, Festschr. R. Keydell (Berlin 1978) 1–19.

<sup>37</sup> Parallels and connections may also be seen between the deaths of these heroes and that of Sarpedon in book xvi: for interesting remarks on the significance of these, and on Sarpedon and his 'code' (xii 310–28) as a foil to the lonelier and more tragic fates of Patroclus, Hector and Achilles, see M. Müller, *Mosaic* iii (1970) 86–103 = *Essays on the Iliad*, ed. J. Wright (Indiana 1978) 105–23.

Hector have both overstepped the limits of their strength and fortune; and in both cases the final execution is assisted by a divine champion who aids the victor. Thus Apollo helps bring about the doom of Patroclus, Athene that of Hector. Moreover, both Patroclus and Hector have a moment of prophetic power before the end comes:<sup>38</sup> Patroclus warns Hector that Achilles will destroy him, and Hector foretells Achilles' death beneath the arrows of Paris, who in his turn will be aided by Apollo (xvi 853-4; xxii 358-60). This divine intervention is far from rendering the human agents insignificant or devoid of interest; rather, the divine support reflects and in a sense symbolises the superiority of the victor. What Patroclus, Hector and Achilles achieve on the battlefield in no way misrepresents their individual heroic stature and prowess.<sup>39</sup> The divine background, however, provides a higher significance and, by granting us a broader vision of the events than the participants possess themselves, achieves a truly tragic irony.

On a larger scale than these individual moments of foresight, the deaths of all three heroes are foretold and foreshadowed throughout the poem.<sup>40</sup> In particular, the poet grants his audience progressive revelations by means of the episodes in which Zeus prophesies subsequent events. These prophecies are full enough to give the listeners an outline of what is to come, and so allow them to savour the grim pattern of irony and reversal of fortune as it unfolds. On the other hand, the details are not sketched in, and some important episodes are not predicted, so that this device does not prevent Homer from utilising the equally vital techniques of surprise and suspense.<sup>41</sup>

As Zeus had promised in i 547-8, he tells Hera first when he chooses to divulge his plans. Firstly, in viii 470-83 he prophesies the rout of the Achaeans, Patroclus' entry into battle, and his death, but nothing further. Secondly, in xv 49-77, he predicts the events of books xvi-xxii, especially the ἀριστεία of Hector, the appearance of Patroclus, the slaying of Sarpedon, the death of Patroclus and the revenge of Achilles—but *not* the later relenting of Achilles and the restoration of Hector's corpse. He also foretells the failure of the Trojan forces after the fall of Hector, and the ultimate sack of Troy (xv 69-71; cf. xxii 410 ff.;<sup>42</sup> also iv 1-103). Irrespective, therefore, of whether the *Iliad* involves major mythological innovation,<sup>43</sup> we can be certain that from these passages the audience knows what is to happen to both Patroclus and Hector, and responds with appropriate pity and anticipation at xi 604 (the poet on Patroclus): ἔκμολεν ἴσος Ἄρηϊ, κακοῦ δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλεν ἀρχή.<sup>44</sup> This effect is sustained and heightened by the further comments of the narrator, and those of Zeus himself, as the action of the subsequent books is played out. Patroclus, Hector and Achilles are all presented as being, in their different ways, blind, overconfident and doomed.

A selection of the most important passages will show better than any paraphrase how Homer, with divine impartiality,<sup>45</sup> achieves the effect described.

xv 610-14 (which must be read in the light of the preceding forecast by the narrator at 592-604):

αὐτὸς γὰρ οἱ ἀπ' αἰθέρος ἦεν ἀμύντωρ  
 Ζεὺς, ὃς μιν πλεόνεσσι μετ' ἀνδράσι μούνον ἔοντα  
 τίμα καὶ κύδαινε. μιννθάδιος γὰρ ἔμελλεν  
 ἔσσεσθ'· ἤδη γὰρ οἱ ἐπόρνευε μόρσιμον ἦμαρ  
 Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη ὑπὸ Πηλεΐδαο βίηφιν.

<sup>38</sup> On the last words of dying men as prophetic, see also Pl. *Ap.* 39c; Virg. *Aen.* iv 614 ff., x 739-41; *Genesis* xlvi-ix; Shakespeare, *R II* ii 31 ff.; Pease on Cic. *Div.* i 63-4.

<sup>39</sup> Further, A. Lesky, *Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos*, SB Heidelberg 1961, 4. Abh., esp. pp. 22-44.

<sup>40</sup> For a useful collection of passages see G. E. Duckworth, *Foreshadowing and Suspense in the Epics of Homer, Apollonius and Virgil* (Princeton 1933) 38-9, 53-5, 60-1, 71, 92, et passim. More briefly, C. H. Moore, *HSCP* xxxii (1921) 109-16.

<sup>41</sup> Compare the method of Euripidean prologues, and of Homer's own proems (cf. B. A. van Groningen, *Med.d.Kon.Med.Ak.* ix.8 [1946]; and on proemia in general, Richardson on *hDem.* 1-3, Austin on Virg. *Aen.* i 1-11, and bibliographies there).

<sup>42</sup> On the significance of this passage see Griffin 1; and compare Priam's speech at xxii 59-76.

<sup>43</sup> For bibliography of this 'neo-analyst' school of criticism, see A. Heubeck in *Homer: Tradition and Invention*, ed. B. Fenik (Leiden 1978) 9 n. 27.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Griffin 85.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. J. T. Kakridis, *Homer Revisited* (Lund 1971) 64.

xvi 46–7: ὡς φάτο λισσόμενος [*sc.* Patroclus] μέγα νήπιος.<sup>46</sup> ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλεν οἶ αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι.

Compare xvi 236–8, 249–56: Zeus will not grant the whole of Achilles' prayer; xvi 644–55: Zeus ponders ἀμφὶ φόνῳ Πατρόκλου when to bring it about, but the actual fact that he is to die is not in question).

xvi 684–88: Πάτροκλος δ' ἵπποισι καὶ Αὐτομέδοντι κελεύσας  
Τρῶας καὶ Λυκίους μετεκίαθε, καὶ μέγ' ἀάσθη  
νήπιος· εἰ δὲ ἔπος Πηληϊάδαο φύλαξεν,  
ἦ τ' ἂν ὑπέκφυγε κῆρα κακὴν μέλανος θανάτιο.  
ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τε Διὸς κρείσσων νόος ἦέ περ ἀνδρῶν.

xvi 692–3: ἔνθα τίνα πρῶτον, τίνα δ' ὕστατον ἐξενάριξας,  
Πατρόκλεις, ὅτε δὴ σε θεοὶ θάνατόνδε κάλεσαν;

xvi 796–800: πάρος γε μὲν οὐ θέμις ἦεν  
ἱππόκομον πῆληκα μαινεσθαι κονίησιν,  
ἀλλ' ἀνδρὸς θείοιο κάρη χαρίεν τε μέτωπον  
ρύετ' Ἀχιλλῆος· τότε δὲ Ζεὺς Ἔκτορι δῶκεν  
ἦ κεφαλῇ φορέειν, σχεδόνθεν δέ οἱ ἦεν ὄλεθρος.<sup>47</sup>

(This motif—that Hector's moment of glory also seals and signifies his own doom—is developed shortly afterwards, in xvii 183–97, in which Hector dons the armour taken from Patroclus' corpse—which is, of course, the armour of Achilles: *cf.* xvii 186, etc.)<sup>48</sup>

xvii 194–7: ὁ δ' ἄμβροτα τεύχεα δύνε  
Πηλεΐδew Ἀχιλλῆος, ἃ οἱ θεοὶ Οὐρανίωνες  
πατρὶ φίλω ἔπορον· ὁ δ' ἄρα ᾧ παιδὶ ὅπασσε  
γηράς· ἀλλ' οὐχ υἱὸς ἐν ἔντεσι πατρὸς ἐγήρα.

Thus even when the drama of Hector and Patroclus is at the centre of the stage, we are not allowed to forget that Achilles' doom is interwoven with theirs, and equally pitiable. Hector has no reason to feel pride or pleasure in the armour and his victory; and when Achilles' victory over Hector finally comes, he too will have little reason to rejoice.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, the fulfilment of his vengeance gives Achilles as little satisfaction as the fulfilment of his prayer to Zeus in the first book: for the latter brings about Patroclus' death, the former Achilles' own.

Like the poet himself, Zeus contemplates the action on earth with foreknowledge and compassion. Above all at xvii 198 ff., when he speaks of Hector thus (201–8):

ἄ δειλ', οὐδέ τί τοι θάνατος καταθύμιός ἐστιν,  
ὅς δὴ τοι σχεδὸν εἶσι· σὺ δ' ἄμβροτα τεύχεα δύνεις  
ἀνδρὸς ἀριστήος . . .

<sup>46</sup> On Homer's use of this word see Bremer (n. 13) 101 n. 9.

<sup>47</sup> The close verbal connection with xxii 403–4 (Zeus permits the defilement of Hector's body) is another link between the two scenes.

<sup>48</sup> See esp. xvii 202–3 (quoted in text), 448–50, 472–3, 693 ἀτὰρ τά γε τεύχε' ἔχει κορυθαίολος Ἔκτωρ (repeated from xvii 122; *cf.* xviii 21), xviii 131–2, 188, 197. The repetitions and emphasis on the physical possession of the armour by Hector make the object symbolically significant. Part of the point of book xviii is that Hector's triumph in acquiring Achilles' old armour is negated by the acquisition of new and greater armour. And in xxii 322–7 it is a weakness in the plundered armour that proves Hector's

undoing (for Virgilian imitation, see *Aen.* x 496 ff., 503–5, xii 941–4). For such significant objects see Griffin ch. i (he does not discuss this example). Again the Homeric technique is inherited by Greek tragedy: see O. P. Taplin, *Greek Tragedy in Action* (London 1978) ch. vi. An obvious parallel is the bow of Philoctetes.

<sup>49</sup> The κλέος gained from his victory does not seem to me to alter this picture, for even glory no longer means anything to Achilles. (xviii 121 is belied by his final attitude in book xxiv: note esp. his indifferent tone at 139–40, and the deep disillusionment expressed in 540–2. See further Griffin 98–101.) This is another way in which the mood and reactions of Achilles during his first wrath (see ix 315–43) are echoed in more tragic circumstances in the final books of the poem.

ἀτάρ τοι νῦν γε μέγα κράτος ἐγγυαλίξω,  
τῶν ποινῆν ὃ τοι οὐ τι μάχης ἔκ νοστήσαντι  
δέξεται Ἀνδρομάχη κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πηλεΐωνος.

We may see here an echo and reversal of Hector's prayer in book vi (476–81). Not only will Andromache never see their son returning proudly with captured armour, but she will never see Hector himself thus again.

While Patroclus lies dead on the plain, the concentration of the Greek army and of Homer's audience is repeatedly directed to the questions 'When will Achilles hear? What will he do?' (see esp. xvii 105, 121, 641, 654, 691, 701, 709). But as yet Achilles sits in untroubled calm by his ships, and his total ignorance of what has happened is powerfully brought out by the following passage, set in the centre of a long series of scenes entirely devoted to the fighting over Patroclus' body:

τοῖον Ζεὺς ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ἵππων  
ἤματι τῷ ἐτάνυσσε κακὸν πόνον· οὐδ' ἄρα πῶ τι  
ἤδεε Πάτροκλον τεθνηότα δίος Ἀχιλλεύς·  
πολλὸν γάρ ῥ' ἀπάνευθε νεῶν μάρναντο θεῶων,  
τείχει ὑπο Τρώων· τό μιν οὐ ποτε ἔλπετο θυμῷ  
τεθνάμεν, ἀλλὰ ζῶν ἐνιχρὶμφθέντα πύλῃσιν  
ἄψ ἀπονοστήσειν, ἐπεὶ οὐδέ τὸ ἔλπετο πάμπαν,  
ἐκπέρσειν πτολίεθρον ἄνευ ἔθην, οὐδέ σὺν αὐτῷ·  
· · ·  
δὴ τότε γ' οὐ οἱ ἔειπε κακὸν τόσον ὅσον ἐτύχθη  
μήτηρ, ὅττι ρά οἱ πολὺ φίλτατος ὤλεθ' ἐταῖρος.

(xvii 400–11)

All Achilles' careful warnings to Patroclus have been frustrated, and as yet he does not even know it.

The irony here is enhanced by the way in which the wishes of Achilles finally prove self-defeating. His actions ever since the first book have brought about this disastrous conclusion. In that book Zeus promised him *τιμὴ* through the rout and humiliation of the Greeks, as well as massive compensation for his mistreatment (i 493–530). As the promise of Zeus, this unfailingly comes true, but in a manner very different from anything Achilles had expected (*cf.* xvii 405, 407 *ἔλπετο* above).

The parallelism between scenes in books i and xviii serves to show this more clearly. In both books Achilles is filled with anger and grief; in both, Thetis comes from the sea to speak to him and offer comfort; in both, she first addresses him with the words:

τέκνον, τί κλαίεις; τί δέ σε φρένας ἵκετο πένθος;  
ἔξάυδα, μὴ κεῦθε.

(i 362–3, xviii 73–4)

But however passionate the anger of Achilles in book i, its pettiness becomes evident in retrospect, when it is replaced by the terrible agony and furious hatred that consumes Achilles when he learns of Patroclus' death. Nevertheless, for all his hatred for Hector, the supreme horror of the situation of Achilles lies in his recognition that he himself has destroyed his beloved friend, by accepting his plea in book xvi and allowing him to enter the battle when he, Achilles, would not be there to protect him.

Achilles therefore does not rebuke his mother or cry curses on Zeus; he admits that his former wish has been fulfilled:<sup>50</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Again there are verbal echoes, through the significant use of *τελεῖν* and cognates: xviii 74 *τετέλεσται* and 79 *ἔξετέλεσεν* should be related not only to xviii 4 *τὰ φρονέοντ' ἀνὰ θυμὸν ἃ δὴ τετελεσμένα ἦεν*, but also to i 523 *ἐμοὶ δέ κε ταῦτα*

*μελήσεται, ὄφρα τελέσω* and 526–7 *οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν παλινάγρετον οὐδ' ἀπατηλόν/οὐδ' ἀτελεύτητον, ὅ τί . . . καταλεύσω*. *Cf.* the title *Ζεὺς τέλειος* (Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 973–4).

xviii 74 (Thetis)

‘ . . . τὰ μὲν δὴ τοι τετέλεσται  
ἐκ Διός, ὡς ἄρα δὴ πρὶν γ’ εὔχεο χεῖρας ἀνασχών,  
· . .

xviii 79 (Achilles)

‘ μῆτερ ἐμή, τὰ μὲν ἄρ μοι Ὀλύμπιος ἐξετέλεσεν·  
ἀλλὰ τί μοι τῶν ἦδος, ἐπεὶ φίλος ὤλεθ’ ἑταῖρος,  
Πάτροκλος, τὸν ἐγὼ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἑταίρων,  
ἴσον ἐμῇ κεφαλῇ τὸν ἀπώλεσα,<sup>51</sup> . . .’

Again, later in the same book Achilles, as he weeps over the corpse of Patroclus, is forced to admit that his hopes of a safe homecoming for them both were empty fantasies:

ἀλλ’ οὐ Ζεὺς ἄνδρεςσι νοήματα πάντα τελευτᾶ. (xviii 328)<sup>52</sup>

As in the Sophoclean examples, human advice and divine forewarning are insufficient guides: a man of superior ability, intelligence and merit, one of τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία, οἶον Οἰδίπους, in Aristotelian terms (*Poet.* 13.53a10),<sup>53</sup> can still go wrong through ignorance of the whole truth, μῆτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν . . . ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀμαρτίαν τινά (*ibid.* 8–10, *cf.* 15–16).

Achilles’ mistake is all the more poignant because his mother had been able to tell him so much, and yet it was not enough: it was still possible for him to overlook the crucial warning that she did once give, that the best of the Myrmidons would be killed by the Trojans during his lifetime (see xviii 9–11).<sup>54</sup> This passage establishes a further significant parallelism between the cases of Patroclus, Hector and Achilles. Each receives a warning on both the divine and the human level. In Patroclus’ case the warning comes first from Achilles (xvi 87–96; *cf.* 684–98); and later, at the height of his ἀριστεία he receives a command from Apollo to give up his vain attempt to storm Troy (xvi 705–11). At this he falls back, but does not withdraw from the field, and so in the end he faces defeat. Hector is warned by Iris that Zeus’ favour will give him victory until the sun sets that day (xi 193–4, 208–9, recalled at xvii 441–55); and just after the fateful appearance of Achilles on the rampart, ready to re-enter the battle, the sun does set (xviii 239–42). But Hector in his moment of glory cannot accept that he has reached the limit of his good fortune. He insists on remaining on the plain that night and eagerly awaits the renewed fighting next day, even though the voice of human reason, in the person of Polydamas,<sup>55</sup> reinforces the divine warning (xviii 243–313, esp. 250–2, 293–5, 305–6). Polydamas is in the right, as the poet’s comment points out with ominous severity (xviii 310–13), and as Hector will later realise (xxii 99–107). Finally there is the case of Achilles himself. Here the embassy-book

<sup>51</sup> On the force of this word see most recently Griffin 163 n. 41, who is more cautious than I would be about finding the meaning ‘destroyed’ present.

<sup>52</sup> For other formulations of this theme, see *Od.* v 103–4, *Hes. Op.* 105 οὕτως οὐ τί πη ἔστι Διὸς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι, 483 ff., *Theog.* 613, Semonides 1.1 ff. W, *Theognis* 141–2, Solon 13.63 ff. W, *id.* 17, Heraclitus B78, Pind. *fr.* 61 Snell, Aesch. *Supp.* 92 ff., 1057, *Ag.* 1487 f., Eur. *Or.* 1545–6, *Hel.* 1137–43 and Kannicht *ad loc.*

<sup>53</sup> On the other hand, ὁ μῆτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη (13.53a8) does not seem an altogether suitable description of Achilles, and it might be said that Aristotle here overstates his point. It is not necessary to deny that a tragic hero can be superior in such qualities, as in birth and fortune, only to insist that he should possess also the human weaknesses that make him akin to ourselves (*cf.* nn. 60–1, 71–2). This is the case with Achilles as with Oedipus.

<sup>54</sup> There is a difficulty in reconciling xviii 9–11 with xvii 404–11: *cf.* Leaf on xvii 408, ‘The discrepancy of course arises from difference of authorship, and we need

not try to remove it by excision of lines’; contrast Reinhardt (n. 5) 373–4. Homer’s words do not seem to make a contradiction inevitable. Thetis had told Achilles many things, including, perhaps, the content of xvii 406–7? *Cf.* xvi 91 ff.: 97–100 (Achilles’ strange prayer) seem to imply that he does know that the Greeks will sack Troy without him and Patroclus, but he wishes that the reverse could be true: *cf.* xviii 329–32; xix 328–33. But Thetis does *not* tell him *now* (on the force of δὴ τότε see Leaf *ad loc.*) that Patroclus *has* fallen (not ‘will fall’). But the passage is difficult, and perhaps deliberately made unclear, on any account. Others may prefer to have recourse to *Tychoismos* (R. D. Dawe, *PCPS* ix [1963] 21–62): so, e.g., M. M. Willcock, *A Companion to Homer’s Iliad* (Chicago/London 1976) on ix 410, xvi 50–1, xvii 408. See also Σ<sup>did</sup> xviii 10–11, for a different approach.

<sup>55</sup> Homer’s treatment of Hector and Polydamas is well expounded by J. M. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago/London 1975) 136–53; see also Erbse (n. 36) 5–6, 8–10.

seems to provide a warning on the human level, especially through the paradigm of Meleager and the fable of the Litai and Ate. The Greeks feel that in some sense Achilles is going too far, wanting too much (see esp. ix 510–12, 523, 598–602, 628–38), and Phoenix especially voices their uneasy suspicion that he may have to suffer for this, even though he does not suspect the form which Achilles' downfall will in fact take.<sup>56</sup> On the divine level, Achilles is warned by Thetis but misunderstands or forgets (above). In each case the pattern is clear: success and glory are promised, but with qualification; the hero ignores the warning or misses its point; and the glory which he sought turns to disaster.

No less important than the resemblances between the main characters are their differences. Again these may usefully be formulated in terms of knowledge, and particularly self-knowledge. It is noteworthy that Patroclus' death comes upon him wholly as a surprise: filled with the fervour of battle, he is struck down from behind by Apollo, whereupon Euphorbus and Hector finish the job (xvi 786–842). Even in defeat he is defiant and contemptuous: he answers taunt with taunt (xvi 844–54), blames the gods for his downfall and declares that even if twenty Hectors had faced him, he could have prevailed (847–8). Apart from his prophecy of Hector's death, he betrays no understanding of the wider scheme of Zeus, nor indeed any appreciation of the impact that his death will have upon Achilles. Above all he sees no further than Hector's death; he shows no knowledge of Achilles' own.

Hector's reaction reveals his characteristic and increasing overconfidence.<sup>57</sup> Here and later his hope is that his success will continue and that he may even be a match for Achilles himself (xvi 860–1, xviii 305–9, xx 366–72, 434–7). But his ambition is shown to be delusion by the comments of Zeus and of the poet himself, even in this very scene (xvi 799–800; cf. xvii 198 ff., quoted above). In the end, Hector, put to flight by Achilles the next day, is forced to acknowledge his error and to confess that Polydamas was right (xxii 99–107). Even then, however, a trace of hope that he might still win out flares up in his heart (xxii 130; also 256–9, 279–80, 285–8). Only when his ally Deiphobus proves to be the treacherous Athene does he recognise that he is doomed, and steels himself for his final hopeless attack, with words that again echo the death-scene of Patroclus:

ὦ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δὴ με θεοὶ θάνατόνδε κάλεσαν.

(xxii 297; cf. xvi 693)

It fits the pattern suggested here that in book xvi the formula is used by the narrator, in book xxii by Hector himself. This reflects the different degrees of insight or awareness which Patroclus and Hector possess at the moment of death. Hector now understands what he had failed to see before and what Patroclus never saw, that the gods supported him before for a purpose, but with that purpose achieved, they will do so no longer; and so, as Hector acknowledges, *νῦν αὐτέ με μοῖρα κικάνει*. (xxii 303; cf. 203–4, 212–13). This speech of Hector's goes beyond even his earlier speech before the walls (xxii 99 ff.) in showing him rid of his illusions. At the last, he recognises that his own calculations and hopes were bound to fail.

The case of Achilles is more complex again. Like Hector, he sees that he has been deceived and destroyed by the very favour of heaven. Like Hector but unlike Patroclus, he recognises also his own responsibility for what has befallen him and those he cares for. Like Hector, he is warned of his imminent death; but unlike him, he chooses the course that will lead to his death with open eyes and without self-deception.<sup>58</sup> Achilles and Hector are opposites in many ways: Achilles the invader, Hector the defender; Achilles son of a goddess, Hector all too human; Achilles a man apart, all but indifferent to concubine and child (xix 56–63, 326–7), Hector a man who fights to

<sup>56</sup> On the integrity of book ix and the place of Phoenix's speech in the structure of the book and of the epic, see esp. D. Motzkus, *Untersuchungen zum 9. Buch der Ilias unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Phoenixgestalt* (Hamburg 1964) 37–46. See also Reinhardt (n. 5) 212–42.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Redfield, *loc. cit.* (n. 55), esp. 145, 150; Willcock (n. 54) on xii 237 f., xiii 823.

<sup>58</sup> See esp. Schadewaldt (n. 36) 257, 263–4; also Griffin 163, who concisely collects and sums up the relevant passages.

protect his beloved family and city; Achilles a lone fighter, Hector leader of a community and its allies.<sup>59</sup> But this does not mean that Achilles is devoid of human illusion and weakness, or that he has nothing to learn after he has made his final choice of death (xviii 90–1, 98–100 and esp. 115–16 = xxii 365–6). Earlier in the poem it is the humiliation of Agamemnon that is all-important to him; later, the punishment of Hector. Neither of these vindictive ends can be permitted to stand as the final expression of the character of Achilles or of the poet's tragic yet compassionate vision.

The association of Patroclus and Hector, stressed by the parallel death-scenes, is one of the means by which the poet shows the gods bringing death and sorrow indiscriminately to both sides. But even this fundamental aspect of the poem is subordinate to a greater theme. Not only the audience, but Achilles himself, comes to see Patroclus and Hector as equals in death; and in them, Achilles also sees himself. Through his suffering and the increased insight that his experience brings, he transcends the values of the Greek army, preoccupied with winning a victory that he will never see. The supreme moment in the last book of the *Iliad* comes when Achilles finds it in himself to respond to the equal suffering in his enemy Priam, the father of Patroclus' killer, and understands that despite the enmity between them, he and Priam have more in common that he can ever again have with his fellow-Greeks. Community of suffering leads to a fuller realisation of their kinship, not by blood or nationality, but as two human beings, the victims of the common fate of man, grief and death.<sup>60</sup>

## V

This mutual understanding and pity (*σμπάθεια, ὁμοιοπάθεια*) is another theme which, inherited from Homer, animates much that is greatest and most moving in Greek tragedy. It is natural, and right, that a man should recognise his own weakness and vulnerability, and that seeing such qualities in another he should understand the bond of humanity which cuts across more temporary or man-made distinctions. Thus in the *Ajax* Odysseus in a famous speech declines to gloat over his humiliated adversary, because he must acknowledge that he too may come to such a state (*Aj.* 124–6, *cf.* 1365–7). Theseus sees the similarity between the aged Oedipus' experiences and his own (*OC* 560–8; *cf.* *Virg. Aen.* i 628–30, viii 333–6). Hecuba begs the merciless victor Odysseus to show magnanimity to the defeated side, for he should not assume that he will always be successful (*Eur. Hec.* 282–5, *cf.* 340; also *Supp.* 549–57)—very much the same grounds on which the more enlightened Cyrus, in Herodotus' account, spares the vanquished Croesus:

καὶ τὸν Κῦρον ἀκούσαντα τῶν ἐρμηνέων τὰ Κροῖσος εἶπε, μεταγνόντα τε καὶ ἐννώσαντα ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον, γενόμενον ἑωυτοῦ εὐδαιμονίῃ οὐκ ἐλάσσω, ζῶντα πυρὶ διδοίῃ, πρὸς τε τούτοισι δέισαντα τὴν τίσιν καὶ ἐπιλεξάμενον ὡς οὐδὲν εἶη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ἀσφαλῆως ἔχον, κελεύειν σβεννύναι τὴν ταχίστην τὸ καιόμενον πῦρ. (Hdt. i 86.6)<sup>61</sup>

<sup>59</sup> *Cf.* (with rather different emphasis) Redfield (n. 55) 108–13, 119–27. On the individualism of Achilles see also Knox, *loc. cit.* (n. 10); J. Griffin, *JHS* xcvi (1977) 43–4; Macleod, *Iliad* xxiv, 23–8.

<sup>60</sup> R. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton 1957) 319 comments: 'It is hardly possible to overestimate the importance for western literature of the *Iliad's* demonstration that the fall of an enemy, no less than of a friend or leader, is tragic and not comic.' See further Vickers (n. 12) ch. ii; K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford 1974) 268–72; F. Martinazzoli, *Sapphica et Vergilia* (Bari 1958), a work known to me only from J. G. Griffith's review in *CR* ix (1959) 285.

<sup>61</sup> Further, note esp. *Od.* viii 485–531, where Odysseus, expecting to enjoy Demodocus' song of his

own glorious deeds at Troy, finds himself weeping tears of pity (531: the preceding simile associates the victor Odysseus with the sufferings of the victims, as does the repetition in 530–1: τῆς δ' ἐλεεινοτάτῳ ἄχει φθινύθουσι παρειάι: ὡς Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐλεεινὸν ὑπ' ὀφρύσι δάκρυον εἶβεν. See also Soph. *Tra.* 303–6, *Phil.* 500–6, Thuc. v 90; perhaps Hdt. vi 21 *δικτῆα κακά*, but the exact sense is disputed, see Macan *ad loc.* The Homeric–tragic ethic of *ὁμοιοπάθεια* should be contrasted with the principle 'do good to your friends and harm to your enemies', for which see J. F. Kells, *Sophocles: Electra* (Cambridge 1973) 8; Dover (n. 60) 180–4; Knox (n. 14) 127–8, 152–3 (= *HSCP* lxxv [1961] 3–5, 29–30).

As often, Homeric practice anticipates the schematising of rhetorical theory:<sup>62</sup> thus Aristotle insists that a misfortune that is to arouse pity must be such that the pitier (in *Il.* xxiv Achilles) can suppose that he, or someone dear to him (Peleus) might suffer in the same way (*Rh.* ii 8.1385b13 ff.; cf. *Rh. Alex.* 1444a12–14).

It can hardly be overemphasised that in Homer, as in tragedy, the poignancy and urgency of the appeal to pity lie in the ease with which the entreaty is often ignored. It has been observed that no human supplication represented in the action of the *Iliad* proves successful before Priam's to Achilles.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, Agamemnon's injunction in vi 55–60 to slaughter all the people of Troy, even the unborn babe in the womb, prepares us for the ever-mounting tide of brutality and destruction<sup>64</sup> which is to culminate in the blood-thirsty vengeance of Achilles, sustained with horrifying effect throughout books xx–xxii. Again, the fears of Priam (xxii 60–76), the laments of the Trojans,<sup>65</sup> and above all Andromache's prophecy of the fate of Astyanax (xxiv 734–9), remind us that the victors will have no mercy. Consequently, the actions of Achilles in book xxiv break out of a pattern, emphasising his uniqueness in a new way. His magnanimity is isolated, and in a sense futile, for it changes nothing in the situation of Priam and Troy, or of Achilles himself; but it would be wrong to see it as any less admirable or precious for that reason.

The scene in which Priam supplicates Achilles is so familiar that only a few specific comments will be required in order to show its importance for the themes of this paper. In the *Iliad* as a whole Achilles is seen to suffer two great wraths, one against Agamemnon, the other against Hector and all associated with him. The first fades into insignificance when the second has begun. The dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon is formally brought to a conclusion in book xix, but there Achilles is consumed by such frantic eagerness to take the field against Hector that he barely takes any notice of the proceedings. In particular he ignores the exhortations to eat in order to strengthen himself (esp. xix 205–14, 305–8). Here the abstinence of Achilles, his indifference to human needs,<sup>66</sup> reinforces his doomed isolation. Similarly in the fighting which follows, he does battle alone, dedicated to his revenge. None but he must be the slayer of Hector (xxii 205–7). But in book xxiv, with the truer reconciliation and the suppression of his second and greater anger, he himself urges food on the grief-stricken Priam, as Odysseus and others had tried to do before in his own case (xxiv 601–20).<sup>67</sup>

In Priam Achilles sees his own father Peleus,<sup>68</sup> and he realises the other side to the killing of Hector—not just revenge and punishment, but the agony of a parent's grief and the certain doom of a whole people. And by analogy, he sees that Hector is to Priam as he himself is to his lonely father Peleus (see esp. xxiv 486–92, 503–4, 534–43). Further, the grief of Achilles for

<sup>62</sup> On Homeric rhetoric see L. Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores*, SÖAW cxxvii.3 (Vienna 1951) 1–10; G. Kennedy, *AJP* lxxviii (1957) 26 ff.; K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley/L.A. 1968) 175–81. On pity in rhetorical theory, with useful references to Homeric precedent, see E. B. Stevens, *AJP* lxv (1944) 1–25; add that Arist. *Rh.* ii 8.1385b27, though more intellectualised (cf. Eur. *Held.* 458–60, fr. 407), corresponds to *Il.* xxiv 157–8 = 186–7.

<sup>63</sup> J. Gould, *JHS* xciii (1973) 80–2. Further, Macleod, *Iliad* xxiv, 15–22.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. C. Segal, *The Theme of the Mutilation of the Corpse in the Iliad*, *Mnemos. suppl.* xvii (1971) 18, 72–3.

<sup>65</sup> For the significance of ritual lamentation, tearing of clothes, etc., see Griffin 2–3 (for tragic parallels to the motif discussed there see Collard on Eur. *Supp.* 990 ff.); Vickers (n. 12) 87–96; M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge 1974) *passim*, esp. chs i–ii, vi, viii; also her index, s.v. 'self-mutilation', 'laceration', etc. In both subject-matter and form the tragic *κομμός* is influenced by *Il.* xxii 437–515, xxiv 718–76 (though for a contrast of the genres, see Macleod on xxiv 721–2). For this aspect of tragedy see H. D. Broadhead,

*Aeschylus: Persae* (Cambridge 1960) appendix 4; Collard on Eur. *Supp.* 1114–64.

<sup>66</sup> For grief-stricken *ἀσπρία* see Griffin 15–17, and add *Od.* iv 788, *hDem.* 47 ff. and Richardson *ad loc.*, *Soph. Aj.* 324, Eur. *Med.* 24, *Hipp.* 135 ff., 277, *Supp.* 1105–6, *Or.* 39–41, 189.

<sup>67</sup> Thus the arguments at xix 155 ff., 178–80, 216 ff., 302 ff., correspond to Achilles' speeches to Priam at xxiv 522–4, 549–51, 599–620; Achilles' statement of his own supreme misfortune in xix 315–37 corresponds to Priam's at xxiv 486–506; Achilles' refusal to bathe (xxiii 38–47) is like Priam remaining uncleansed of the dung in which he grovelled after Hector's death (xxii 414, xxiv 162–5); Achilles cannot sleep (xxiv 3–13; cf. xxiii 62–7, where he sleeps only to dream of Patroclus), and Priam has not closed his eyes since Hector's death (xxiv 635–42). Note also the bitter injunction *οὐδέ μιν ἀνοστήσεις* (xxiv 551, cf. 756; *Soph. El.* 137 ff. is an instance of this motif in tragedy).

<sup>68</sup> Compare the way in which Deianira comes to see both the similarity (*Soph. Tra.* 465, cf. 25) and the differences between herself and her rival Iole (303–6, 441–8).

Patroclus corresponds to that of Priam, and all the Trojans, for the lost Hector. But the chain of destruction is not ended; for at the end of the poem both Achilles and Troy must be resigned to the inevitable. The events presented in the *Iliad* itself have determined the destruction of both.

The suffering of Achilles and the sympathy he feels for Priam make themselves manifest in generalisation, for in both Homer and tragedy the individual struggles to see himself in a context, and so to make some coherent sense of his misery;<sup>69</sup> which is to say, again, that it is part of human nature to seek to understand the course of events even when they are beyond human understanding. Homeric epic differs from the drama in presenting more fully and impartially the actual decisions and motivations of the gods, which may be weighed and assessed against the imperfect guesses of the human participants. But with due allowance for poetic elaboration (in the imagery of the two jars), Achilles' account of the state of man is borne out by the preceding action, whereas his earlier guesses, like those of Agamemnon, Hector and the rest, were not. Consequently the utterance of Achilles, especially in such a scene and with such a companion, possesses much more significance and power.

Part of that significance lies in the consolatory force of the generalisation: it is not Priam alone who has suffered (525 ff., answering 505).<sup>70</sup> But this is cold comfort at best, as both Achilles and Homer know. We should rather see Achilles as trying to instil in both Priam and himself a greater degree of objectivity and realism. Again suffering brings a fuller kind of understanding, if in the midst of it the two men can make themselves look beyond the individual's sorrow, beyond even the combined sorrow of two opponents and two sides,<sup>71</sup> and can contemplate these particular griefs in the light of the true condition of all humanity.<sup>72</sup>

At the end of the poem there is no more room for illusion: both Achilles and Priam finally know. But as often in literature as in life, that knowledge, and even the moment of mutual understanding and sympathy that follows from it, is powerless to alter the course of subsequent events. The imperfect knowledge of mankind can never hope to outwit the gods, just as mortal success can never surpass or outlast their eternal joys.

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<sup>69</sup> For instance, Hyllus' speech at the end of *Trachiniae* (lines 1257–78 are incredibly rejected by Dawe: no supporting argument in his *Studies*). Eur. *Tro.* 1240–5 is another good example, and one with evident Homeric background: cf. *Il.* iii 125–8, vi 355–8, *Od.* i 346–59, viii 577–80, xxiv 196–202; Griffin 97–102; W. Marg, *Homer über die Dichtung*<sup>2</sup> (Munster 1971); Macleod, *Iliad* xxiv, 1–8, and his paper 'Homer on poetry and the poetry of Homer', to be published in his *Collected Papers*. This passage of *Troades* refutes the contention of Taplin (n. 28) 133 and of D. Bain, *Actors and Audience* (Oxford 1977) 208 ff., that no case of theatrical self-reference can be found in Greek tragedy. Hecuba's utterance here is in fact very close to the passage of *Julius Caesar* cited by Bain 209 n. 1. (Tangentially relevant to this question: Bond on Eur. *HF* 1021 f.)

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *Od.* i 353–5; R. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur*, *Zetemata* xviii (Munich 1958) 54 f. The uselessness of grieving over an inevitable loss is 'consolatio pervulgata quidem illa maxime' (Cic. *Fam.* v 16.2).

<sup>71</sup> On the absence of partisanship or of any kind of 'panhellenism' in the *Iliad* see Kakridis (n. 45) 54 ff.; also C. S. Lewis, *A Preface to Paradise Lost* (London 1942) ch. v. In tragedy, the message of Aeschylus' *Persae* is not aimed at barbarians alone: see e.g. Broadhead (n. 65) xv–xviii, xxi, xxviii–ix; H. D. F. Kitto, *Poiesis* (Berkeley/L.A. 1966) 74–106. In Eur. *IA* I take it that the character and behaviour of the participants is meant to

undermine the not-so-high ideals expressed by Agamemnon and picked up by Iphigenia (*contra* D. J. Conacher, *Euripidean Drama* [Toronto 1967] 261–4, with further bibliography). Note also the portrayal of the Trojan captives in *Hec.*, *Tro.*, *Andr.* A striking line which epitomises Euripides' realistic, and Homeric, stand on this is *Tro.* 764: (Andromache speaks) ὦ βάρβαρ' ἐξευρόντες Ἕλληνες κακά. Here as elsewhere (n. 61) Homer anticipates the best elements of fifth-century ethics: cf. Antiph. Soph. B44b DK; Eur. *Phaeth.* 163 and Diggle *ad loc.* Contrast the facile arrogance of popular opinion about βάρβαροι: e.g. Isoc. iv 131, xv 293, and even Arist. *Pol.* vii 7.1327b20 ff. Further, Dover (n. 60) 83 ff., 279–83; F. W. Walbank, *Phoenix* v (1951) 41–60.

<sup>72</sup> Priam and Achilles are paradigms of humanity; which is not to deny that they are also vividly imagined and fully rounded characters. For individuals in tragedy as *exempla* of the human condition, see esp. Aesch. *Ag.* 1331–42, Soph. *OT* 1186–96, *Ant.* 1155–71; also H. Friis Johansen, *General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis* (Copenhagen 1959) ch. viii. Such archetypal figures are fit subject matter for poetry that is concerned with something broader than the narrative of an individual or a single historical sequence of events. Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 9.1451a36–b11; perhaps Thuc. i 22.4? Further, F. W. Walbank, *Historia* ix (1960) 216–34; G. E. M. de Ste Croix, in *The Ancient Historian and his Materials*, Studies presented to C. E. Stevens, ed. B. Levick (Farnborough 1975) 51–2.